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Introduction
The 2016 referendum decision by the United Kingdom to 
leave the European Union has been heralded as one of the 
most visible examples of the growing strength of right-wing 
populism in the advanced industrialised world.1 How do we 
know, then, that the Brexit decision was truly the manifesta-
tion of right-wing populist sentiment? Euroskepticism is 
hardly new to the UK or the Consevative party, and has been 
widespread on the right in the United Kingdom long before 
the recent increase in support for right-wing populist parties 
in Europe as a whole (Forster 2002; Norton 1990; Evans 
1998). Recent research shows that both populism and anti-
immigrant sentiment, the core features of right-wing pop-
ulism, predict support for Brexit individually (Hobolt 2016; 
Goodwin and Milazzo 2017). This is different, however, than 
showing the effect of right-wing populism, which suggests an 
interactive effect between nativism and anti-elite attitudes.
Using survey data from a multi-wave panel survey of 
British respondents, we find such an interaction. Anti-elite 
sentiment increased support for Brexit by 17 percentage points 
among those high in nativism, but anti-elite sentiment had no 
effect on those low in nativism. Those with higher anti-immi-
grant attitudes and distrust of politicians had a predicted prob-
ability of 66% for voting to leave, whereas the same class of 
nativist voters with more muted anti-elite feelings were largely 
on the fence, with a 49% chance of supporting Brexit.
What is Populism? What is Right-
Wing Populism?
Much progress has been made in conceptualising pop-
ulism in recent years. There is now a general consensus 
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that populism is, in Mudde’s words, a ‘thin-centered ide-
ology’ that considers society to be ultimately separated 
into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure 
people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’, and which argues that 
politics should be an expression of the volonté générale 
(general will) of the people (Mudde 2007, 23; see also 
Stanley 2008; Jagers and Walgrave 2007; Canovan 1999; 
Elchardus and Spruyt 2016, 114). Authors note the strong 
moralistic streak in populism. Elites are not incompetent 
and ineffective but rather disingenuous and self-serving. 
Hawkins notes that populism is accompanied by a 
Manichaean discourse that identifies Good with a unified 
will of the people and Evil with a conspiring elite. The 
populist notion of the General Will ascribes particular vir-
tue to the views and collective traditions of common, ordi-
nary folk, who are seen as the overwhelming majority 
(Hawkins 2009, 3). Politicians and other elites are thought 
by populists to be dishonest and profit-seeking. Because 
of this, populists endorse more direct forms of democratic 
governance such as referendums that allow ordinary indi-
viduals to circumvent ‘backroom deals and shady com-
promises’ (Canovan 1999, 6).
Populist ideology is thin in the sense that although it 
incorporates a set of substantive beliefs about politics, it is 
not fleshed out enough to produce a specific policy agenda. 
It must be connected to a particular type of adversary said 
to be taking advantage of the population as a whole 
(Canovan 1999; Jagers and Walgrave 2007). Populism 
needs a focus for its animosity, a foe generally thought to be 
in cahoots with political elites that are doing the people 
harm. This adversary can vary enormously, and helps 
define whether a party or movement is a manifestation of 
right-wing or left-wing populism (Elchardus and Spruyt 
2016; Stanley 2008; Hawkins 2009, 24). In the case of 
Brexit, finding an enemy to enemy to fill this role is easy 
and straightforward – the EU and bureaucrats in Brussels.
The key element that seems to distinguish right-wing 
populism from other forms is its racial and ethnic compo-
nent. Mudde (2004, 2007) argues that right-wing populists 
are nativists who claim to represent the true people who 
make up the true nation and whose purity is being muddied 
by new entrants. He writes, ‘nativism is defined here as an 
ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclu-
sively by members of the native group “the nation” and that 
nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally 
threatening to the homogenous nation-state’ (Mudde 2007, 
19). This gives right-wing populism its particular ethnic, 
cultural and racial caste. Consequently, concerns about 
immigration are the clearest expression of right-wing pop-
ulism, many argue (Betz 1994). Recently, Inglehart and 
Norris (2016) equate populism in the advanced industrial-
ised world with these kind of nativist beliefs. Nativism adds 
substance to who is doing harm to the people, which in left-
wing populism might be replaced by the enemy of big 
banks or multinational corporations.
It is important, however, to be mindful of the fact that 
nativist sentiments may be ‘populist’ in the sense that they 
assert the privileges, often thought to be unfairly fading, of 
the most numerous racial, ethnic or religious group against 
newcomers (Gest 2016; Elchardus and Spruyt 2016; Parker 
and Barreto 2014). However, nativism need not necessarily 
be linked with anti-elitist beliefs. In other words, there is 
nothing inherently anti-establishment about a commitment 
to a racially, culturally and ethnically homogenous society. 
Indeed authoritarianism – in other words, deference to 
elites – and strong in-group identity generally go together 
(Altemeyer 1981; Graham et al. 2009). We define ‘right-
wing populism’ as the combination of anti-elitism and 
nativist identity, arguing that this particular psychological 
cocktail was a likely driver of Brexit attitudes.
Existing literature has explored the influence of nativ-
ism on European integration attitudes. Some studies show 
that attitudes toward immigrants are the most important 
predictors of citizens’ support for the EU (de Vreese and 
Boomgaarden 2005; de Vreese et al. 2008; McLaren 2002; 
Azrout et al. 2011). More broadly, McLaren (2002) argues 
that attitudes toward the European integration tend to be 
largely based on a general hostility toward other cultures; 
therefore, individuals who are more concerned about 
national degradation perceive heightened threat to national 
integrity from both domestic minority groups and the EU. 
Goodwin and Milazzo (2017) show the important role 
played by anti-immigrant sentiment in the Brexit decision 
in particular and Hobolt (2016) also demonstrates that pop-
ulism predicts support for leaving the EU.
However, to say that right-wing populism had an effect 
on the Brexit vote implies something more than the additive 
effect of nativism and anti-elite attitudes. To show that right-
wing populism affected the Brexit vote suggests an interac-
tion. It implies that the effect of populism and nativism in 
combination is stronger than the additive effect of the two. 
No study (that we are aware of) looks at the interaction of 
anti-elitism and nativism – what we use for the purposes of 
our paper as the definition of right-wing populism. Right 
wing populism is a constellation of attitudes that should 
have an effect that is more than the some of its parts.
Research design
The data used in the analyses below come from an eight-
wave panel study of Great Britain, administered by the sur-
vey firm YouGov. The initial wave of the study was fielded 
in November 2011 (n = 2780), and the last wave was finished 
in April 2015 (n = 2687; 978 of these final wave respondents 
participated in both the first and final waves).2 Although 
cross-sectional surveys have limits in their ability to unam-
biguously demonstrate causality, the multi-wave design 
helps considerably in this regard. Our key independent vari-
ables are measured early in the panel in Wave 2. We did not 
begin asking our key outcome variable until Wave 5 (and we 
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ask it in the final four waves of the panel). Having our key 
independent variables come temporally prior (not by minutes 
as in a typical survey but by months/years in our panel study) 
to our measures of Brexit opinions helps make a much 
stronger causality case, particularly because we asked our 
nativism and anti-elitism questions well before there was a 
concrete plan to offer a referendum. Consequently, there is 
little reason to think that attitudes about a referendum on EU 
membership are causing nativist and anti-elite sentiment.
Dependent variable: Support for Britain leaving 
the EU
Our outcome variable examines support for the UK leaving 
the EU. Fortunately, the specific wording of our question 
(first asked approximately three years before the 23 June 
2016 referendum) very closely matched the specific ballot 
paper. Specifically, we asked respondents ‘If there was a 
referendum on Britain’s membership in the United Nations 
(UN), how would you vote?’ Respondents could choose 
‘leave’, ‘remain’, ‘would not vote’, or ‘don’t know’ (full 
question wording is available online in Appendix A). We 
recoded these responses into a three-point variable, where 
the greatest values indicate a desire to leave the EU, the 
intermediate category a plan not to vote or an undecided 
attitude, and the lowest value a desire to remain. In online 
Appendix B, we show that responses to this question were 
remarkably stable over time and reveal just how closely 
divided the outcome was always going to be.
Anti-elitism
Our survey includes a large battery of questions on multiple 
dimensions of political efficacy that allow us to measure 
populism. Our measure of anti-elite sentiment comes from a 
subset of questions from a larger battery of political efficacy. 
Although this subscale is often described as capturing trust 
towards incumbent politicians generally (Craig et al. 1990), 
the simple converse is that it shows distrust in politicians and 
therefore reveals sentiment against political elites. We use an 
additive scale of four survey questions to measure this anti-
elite sentiment, which form a reliable scale (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.77). Full question wording is available online in 
Appendix A. This battery of questions was asked in the sec-
ond wave (May 2012) of our eight-wave panel.3
Nativism
Nativism is measured through a battery of 10 Likert scale 
questions capturing attitudes towards immigration, Islam, 
and non-white citizens in the UK. Opposition to immigra-
tion stands out here because it is the most obvious expres-
sion of belief in an ethnically and culturally homogenous 
people. The items create a clear one-dimensional scale 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.9). We use an additive scale in our 
models. Full question wording is available online in 
Appendix A, but examples are ‘The United Kingdom has 
benefitted from the arrival in recent decades of people from 
many different countries and cultures’ (reverse-coded) and 
‘All further immigration to the UK should be halted.’ This 
battery of questions was asked in the second wave (May 
2012) of our eight-wave panel.
The interaction of nativism and anti-elitism
If Brexit was in large part a right-wing populist product, we 
expect that the interaction of these variables will lead to high 
levels of support for leaving the UN. To examine the interac-
tion between nativist and anti-elitist sentiment, we create a 
series of dummy variables by splitting respondents at the 
medians of these two variables to create four groups: those 
who are low in both nativism and anti-elite sentiment 
(LN-LAE, the excluded or baseline category in the statistical 
models); those who are low in nativism but high in anti-elite 
sentiment (LN-HAE); those who are high in nativism but low 
in anti-elite sentiment (HN-LAE); and those who are high in 
both nativism and anti-elite sentiment (HN-HAE). The distri-
bution of these respondents can be found online in Appendix 
C; all categories are well-populated. This categorisation both 
eases presentation of our interaction effects but also has a 
methodological grounding. As Hainmueller et al. (2017) 
remind us, multiplicative interaction models are based on the 
crucial assumption that the interaction effect is linear, which 
fails unless the effect of the independent variable changes at a 
constant rate with the moderator. Indeed an analysis of our 
data reveal that our data does not meet this strong assumption. 
Therefore we dichotomize our key independent variables. We 
expect that those who are high in nativist sentiment will, on 
average, be more likely to support Britain leaving the UN. 
However, we expect that the effect of anti-elitism will be sen-
sitive to how nativist one is. More specifically, we expect that 
among those who have lower levels of nativist sentiment, low 
levels of efficacy will not manifest themselves in appreciably 
higher levels of support for leaving the EU. However, among 
those who have strong nativist leanings, we expect that the 
added fuel of high levels of anti-elite sentiment should lead to 
a significant increase in desire to withdraw from the EU. 
Importantly, each of these four groups is sufficiently well 
populated for meaningful comparisons. In the table of ordered 
probit results that comes later, we refer to abbreviations of 
these groups, which we present here for easy reference.
Control variables
There is a large literature on the determinants of Brexit 
(Clarke et al. 2017), Euroskepticism and Europhilia in mem-
ber countries of the EU that helps us identify important con-
trol variables, such as authoritarianism, ideology, globalisation 
attitudes, economic sentiment and demographic attributes. 
Full question wording is available online in Appendix A.
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Results
To analyze the effect of our independent variables on support 
for exiting the EU, we ran a series of ordered probits. For 
each wave, we present two models. The first model for each 
wave only includes indicator variables to identify the four 
key attitudinal subgroups. The second model includes the 
full slate of control variables we discuss above. Results to 
Table 1. Support for the UK leaving the EU (Brexit).
Wave 5 Wave 6 Wave 7 Wave 8
 March 2014 May 2014 June 2014 April 2015
Low nativism/High anti-elite −0.25* −0.02 −0.16 0.06 −0.15 0.02 −0.16 −0.00
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
High nativism/Low anti-elite 0.91*** 0.59*** 1.00*** 0.64*** 1.00*** 0.63*** 1.01*** 0.66***
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13)
High nativism/High anti-elite 1.23*** 0.94*** 1.37*** 1.04*** 1.36*** 1.03*** 1.40*** 1.10***
 (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Authoritarianism 1.04*** 1.30*** 1.06*** 1.06***
 (0.18) (0.20) (0.22) (0.24)
Ideology 1.70*** 1.38*** 1.38*** 1.46***
 (0.21) (0.23) (0.24) (0.29)
University degree −0.16* −0.17* −0.20* −0.22*
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
Internal efficacy −0.04 −0.06 −0.01 −0.02
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Economic sentiment −0.31 −0.51* −0.45 −0.58*
 (0.21) (0.23) (0.23) (0.29)
Globalisation negative 0.52*** 0.38* 0.53** 0.33
 (0.14) (0.15) (0.16) (0.18)
British identity −0.12 −0.11 0.11 −0.18
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.18) (0.20)
Support for redistribution −0.45*** −0.51*** −0.44** −0.42*
 (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17)
Age 0.15 0.38 0.22 0.33
 (0.20) (0.21) (0.23) (0.28)
Female 0.20** 0.16 0.14 0.19
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
London −0.11 −0.10 −0.04 0.04
 (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Scotland −0.32* −0.18 −0.07 −0.18
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.19)
High nativism/Low anti-elite -  
Low nativism/High anti-elite 
1.16*** 0.61*** 1.16*** 0.58*** 1.15*** 0.61*** 1.16*** 0.67***
 (0.10) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
High nativism/High anti-elite - 
Low nativism/High anti-elite
1.47*** 0.96*** 1.52*** 0.99*** 1.52*** 1.02*** 1.55*** 1.11***
 (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15)
High nativism/High anti-elite - 
High nativism/Low anti-elite
0.31*** 0.35*** 0.37*** 0.40*** 0.36*** 0.41*** 0.38*** 0.44***
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13)
Number of observations 1553 1553 1331 1331 1294 1294 938 938
Pseudo R-squared 0.12 0.20 0.13 0.21 0.13 0.20 0.14 0.21
For the Wave 5 model, economic sentiment is measured in Wave 5; for Waves 6 and 7, economic sentiment is measured in Wave 6; for Wave 8, 
economic sentiment is measured in Wave 8. Ordered probit. SEs are expressed in parentheses. Cutpoints are omitted. ‘LN-LAE’ is the excluded 
category. LN-LAE: Low-Nativist/Low Anti-Elite; HN: High Nativist/Low Anti-Elite.
*p < 0.05.
**p < 0.01.
***p < 0.001.
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these models are presented in Table 1; Figure 1 presents pre-
dicted probabilities from the fully specified model using the 
Wave 8 data with all other variables set to their means.4 The 
baseline or excluded categories in all models are those who 
are low in both nativism and anti-elite sentiment. The regres-
sion coefficients and associated p-values for our indicator 
variables represent the difference between that group (e.g. 
High nativist/High anti-elite) and the excluded category. The 
lower panel in the table computes difference-in-means and 
associated SEs and p-values for the full set of pairwise 
comparisons.
Results conform to expectations.5 As expected, high-
nativists are consistently more supportive of leaving the 
EU than are low-nativists. However, whether there is an 
effect from anti-elite sentiment depends on whether one is 
in the high-nativist or low-nativist group. Anti-elite senti-
ment does not lead to an increase in support for leaving 
the EU among those who are low in nativist sentiment in 
any of the eight models. Yet, in all models there is a sig-
nificant additional effect on top of nativist sentiment for 
anti-elite sentiment for those who are in the high nativist 
category. (The difference between those who are high 
nativist/low anti-elite (or HN/LAE) and those who are 
high nativist/high anti-elite (or HN/HAE) is indicated in 
the second panel in Table 1 in the row labeled ‘HN/HAE 
- HN/LAE’.) Interestingly, the difference between these 
two groups gets marginally larger in the fully specified 
model compared to the sparsely specified model. The 
effect of anti-elite sentiment on support for leaving the 
EU is limited and concentrated to those above the median 
on nativism.6
All of the other variables have been rescaled from zero 
(0) to one (1), allowing one to roughly compare the magni-
tude of coefficients (also true of the models in the online 
appendices). The controls and alternative explanations that 
matter are those that line up with previous research into 
support for Euroskepticism.
Conclusion
The British public’s vote to leave the UK appears to have 
indeed been a nativist reaction to the threat posed by the 
EU. However, the anti-establishment votes among those 
nativists seem to have a particularly strong antipathy to the 
EU. As we have argued, this indicates that Brexit was 
indeed a right-wing populist moment. Typically, British 
resistance to further encroachments of EU authority was a 
function of leftist protectionist sentiment and conservative 
concerns about erosions of national sovereignty. Our paper 
shows that although the latter was still important in deter-
mining Brexit attitudes, right-wing populism was indeed a 
potent force in the outcome.
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Notes
1. Britain allowed its populist right to rise (2016) The 
Guardian, 24 June; Why the far-right is growing in the UK 
and beyond (2016) The Independent, 31 May; Right-wing 
populism is prevailing in left-wing strongholds around the 
world (2016) The New York Times, 27 June; Populist anger 
upends politics on both sides of the Atlantic (2016) The New 
York Times, 24 June.
2. The YouGov sampling frame includes the three home coun-
tries of England, Scotland, and Wales, but excludes Northern 
Ireland. The panel was periodically refreshed with new 
respondents. Panelists continued to be invited to take part in 
survey waves.
3. These questions capture the same sort of attitudes previ-
ously used to capture populism in other studies. In a study 
of party discourse, Pauwels (2011) uses words such as ‘arro-
gant’, ‘promise’, ‘betray’, ‘disgrace’, or ‘truth’ to measure 
populism. A survey by Rooduijn (2014) asks respondents 
whether politicians are honest, reliable and keep their prom-
ises in order to measure populism. However, we recognize 
that our measures capture only the anti-elite elements of pop-
ulism, not two other features: a belief in direct democracy 
and a faith in ordinary people. Silva et al. (2018) note the 
centrality of inefficacy to populism.
4. Predicted probabilities are calculated using the margins com-
mand in STATA 14 (which uses the delta method). All other 
variables are held at their mean.
5. The online appendices (available in the supplementary files) 
contain several robustness tests. Online Appendix D shows 
results with the nativism and anti-elite scales, and also shows 
the median split models with an interaction term instead of the 
categorical variable approach we take here. In online Appendix 
E, we show that our results are not sensitive to the inclusion or 
coding of the middle category of our dependent variable through 
multinomial models and dichotomous probit models in which 
we exclude the middle category, code the middle category as 
‘remain’, or recode the middle category as ‘leave’. Results are 
consistent across all of these alternate specifications.
6. In online Appendix F, we demonstrate that the effect of anti-
elite sentiment appears to be fairly linear among high nativ-
ists by separating the former variable into terciles (see Table 
8 and Figure 2 in online appendix). This relationship can be 
seen most clearly in Figure 1, which uses predicted prob-
abilities calculated from the Wave 8 (April 2015) saturated 
model.
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